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The Commitment to Development Index of the Center for Global Development rates 21 rich 
countries on the “development-friendliness” of their policies. It is revised and updated annually. In 
the 2004 edition, the component on foreign assistance combines quantitative and qualitative 
measures of official aid, and of fiscal policies that support private charitable giving. The 
quantitative measure uses a net transfers concept, as distinct from the net flows concept in the net 
Official Development Assistance measure of the Development Assistance Committee, which does 
not net out interest received. The qualitative factors are three: a penalty for tying aid; a 
discounting system that favors aid to poorer, better-governed recipients; and a penalty for “project 
proliferation.” The selectivity weighting approach avoids some conceptual problems inherent in the 
Dollar and Levin (2004) elasticity-based method. The proliferation penalty derives from a 
calibrated model of aid transaction cost developed in Roodman (forthcoming). The charitable 
giving measure is based on an estimate of the share of observed private giving to developing 
countries that is attributable to a) lower overall taxes (income effect) and b) specific tax incentives 
for giving (price effect). Despite the adjustments, overall results are dominated by differences in 
quantity of official aid given. This is because while there is a seven-fold range in net concessional 
transfers/GDP among the score countries, variation in overall aid quality across donors appears far 
lower, and private giving is generally small. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden score 
highest while the largest donors in absolute terms, the United States and Japan, score in the 
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1 The author thanks Mark McGillivray for helpful reviews of earlier drafts, Jean-Louis Grolleau for gracious assis-
tance with the data, and Alicia Bannon for her contributions to the charitable giving section of this paper. Rich nations are often compared on how much they share their wealth with poorer countries. The 
Nordics and the Netherlands, it is noted, are the most generous with foreign assistance, while the 
United States gives the least aid per unit of gross domestic product. In 2002, the final reports of 
both the International Conference on Financing for Development, in Monterrey, Mexico, and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, in Johannesburg, judged donors on aid quantity too, 
calling on them all to move toward giving at least 0.7 percent of their national income in aid, as 
few now do. (UN 2002a, p. 9; UN 2002b, p. 52) 
The measure of aid implicitly or explicitly referenced in all these comparisons and 
benchmarks is “net overseas development assistance” (net ODA), which is a measure of aid 
quantity defined by the donor-funded Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in Paris. DAC 
counts total grants and concessional (low-interest) loans given to developing countries, and sub-
tracts principle repayments received from those developing countries on outstanding conces-
sional loans (thus the “net”).
2 
Yet it is widely recognized that some dollars and euros of foreign aid do more good than 
others. While some aid has funded vaccinations whose effectiveness can be measured in pennies 
per life saved, other aid has handsomely paid donor-country consultants to write policy reports 
that collect dust on shelves, or merely helped recipients make interest payments on old aid loans. 
As a result, a simple quantity metric is hardly the last word on donor performance. 
This paper describes an index of donor performance that takes the standard quantity 
measure as a starting point. It is motivated by the desire to incorporate determinants of aid im-
pact other quantity into the Commitment to Development Index (Roodman 2004; CGD and FP 
2004). The aid index was introduced last year (Roodman 2003) and has since been revised in re-
sponse to comments.
3 At its heart, it is an attempt to quantify some aspects of aid quality. But it 
also departs from net ODA in its definition of aid quantity, and in factoring in tax policies that 
support private giving. 
Because this aid measure is designed to draw entirely from available statistics, primarily 
from the extensive DAC databases, many—perhaps most—important aspects of aid quality are 
still not reflected in the index—factors such as the realism of project designs and the effective-
ness of structural adjustment conditionality. Moreover, most variation in aid quality may occur 
within donor’s aid portfolios rather than across donors. As a result, while there is a sevenfold 
range in net ODA/GDP among the 21 rich countries scored here, the calculations in this paper 
reveal nothing like that sort of variation in aid quality across donors. Moreover, including private 
giving does not change this picture because it appears to be much smaller than official giving in 
most countries. Thus sheer quantity of official aid is still the dominant determinant of donors’ 
scores on this index, as was noted last year, and as McGillivray (2003) emphasized in his cri-
tique. 
Still, the measure does highlight some interesting differences among donors, and does 
somewhat rearrange the usual standings. Japan is especially hurt the netting out of its large 
                                                 
2 DAC considers a loan concessional if it has a grant element of at least 25 percent of the loan value, using a 10 per-
cent discount rate. 
3 The major changes since 2003 are: no longer netting out administrative costs; no longer discounting multilateral 
technical cooperation as if it were tied; a “project proliferation” penalty based on the share of committed aid dollars 
committed in small amounts; a new selectivity weighting system that distinguishes between program and project aid; 
and a reward for tax policies that encourage private charitable giving. amounts of interest received. Small donors such as Greece, Ireland, and New Zealand are pulled 
low by the apparent tendency to spread their small aid budgets thinly, over many projects.
4 
In the last three decades or so, researchers have taken three broad approaches to cross-
country quantitative assessment of aid quality. Since at least the early 1970s, econometric studies 
have done of the determinants of donors’ aid allocations, such as recipient’s poverty rate and 
level of oil exports (citations are below). Though often not evaluative in character, the approach 
offers a way to measure one aspect of aid quality, selectivity, by using the regression coefficients 
on indicators of recipient need and development potential. How best to integrate such results 
with aid quantity into a single performance index is less obvious, however. Attempts to create a 
single index began with Mark McGillivray (1989, 1994), who essentially computed the weighted 
sum to each donor’s aid disbursements to all recipients, basing weights on recipient GDP/capita 
as an indicator of need. The third approach is the newest and most sophisticated. Drawing on the 
literature on determinants of aid allocation, McGillivray, Leavy, and White (2002), formally 
model allocation, giving donors utility functions that depend on the commercial and geopolitical 
value of recipients, as well as developmental need and potential; compute optimal allocations; 
then penalize donors to the extent they deviate from optima. 
The donor performance measure described here is closest in spirit to McGillivray’s origi-
nal, but more ambitious than all previous approaches in scope of the information that it combines 
into single index. It factors quality of recipient governance as well as poverty into the selectivity 
scoring system, penalizes tying of aid, handles reverse flows (debt service) in a consistent way, 
penalizes project proliferation (overloading recipient governments with the administrative bur-
den of many small aid projects), and rewards tax policies that encourage private charitable giving 
to developing countries. 
This paper details the calculations and illustrates them with 2002 data, the latest avail-
able. The first six sections describe the computations involved in rating official aid programs: 
their final output is “quality-adjusted aid quantity” in dollars, or simply “quality-adjusted aid.” 
They treat multilateral and bilateral donors in parallel, so that the World Bank’s main conces-
sional lending program, for instance, can be compared for selectivity to Denmark’s aid program. 
The section describing the proliferation penalty is informed by a new model of project prolifera-
tion costs that will be published separately (Roodman 2004b). The penultimate section describes 
how the quality-adjusted aid of multilaterals is allocated back to the bilaterals that fund them, in 
order to give national governments scores on official aid that reflect both their own aid programs 
and their contributions to multilaterals. The last section describes how the aid index now factors 
in tax policies that favor private charitable giving. 
1.  The starting point: gross disbursements of ODA and OA 
The starting point for the calculation of quality-adjusted official aid is gross disbursements of 
ODA and Official Aid (OA), disaggregated by donor and recipient. In DAC terminology, OA is 
concessional aid meeting the ODA definition, except that where ODA goes to countries conven-
tionally thought of as developing, OA goes to “Part II” countries—most European states that 
emerged out of the Soviet bloc and richer non-DAC members such as Israel and Singapore. DAC 
excludes OA from its most frequently cited statistics, perhaps out of concern that assistance to 
                                                 
4 The results in this paper differ slightly from the final CDI aid results published in Roodman (2004) and CGD and 
FP (2004) because of a few small changes made after the official numbers were frozen, one of them correcting a 
mistake. Later footnotes describe them. The changes have minor effects on scores and ranks. such rich countries stretches the meaning of “aid.” I include OA because some Part II countries, 
such as Ukraine, are poorer than many Part I countries.
5 And since the selectivity adjustment (de-
tailed below) heavily discounts aid to the richest developing countries, there is less risk that 
counting OA will misrepresent aid flows. 
DAC reports both commitments and disbursements of ODA and OA, but its press re-
leases normally focus on disbursement. Similarly, I use disbursements. It has been argued that 
commitments better indicate donor policies (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976) on the idea that 
recipient absorptive capacity limits largely explain any shortfalls in disbursements. But commit-
ment-disbursement divergences could reflect bottlenecks on either side of the donor-recipient 
relationship. If they are large and persistent, they may reflect a tendency of certain donors to 
promise more than they can realistically deliver, or a failure to learn from history that certain re-
cipients cannot absorb aid as fast as donors hope. On balance, it seems best to avoid the risk of 
rewarding donors for overpromising aid or systematically underestimating the capacity to absorb 
it, by sticking with disbursements. 
Gross disbursements of ODA and OA, which I call simply “gross aid,” are in the first 
column of Table 2. Among bilaterals, the United States gave the most gross aid to non-DAC 
governments in 2002, while Japan came in second. Among multilaterals, the European Commis-
sion disbursed the most, followed by the World Bank’s International Development Assosiciation 
(IDA). (Bilateral contributions to multilaterals are not counted here. They enter later.) Most of 
the calculations in the aid index are done for each donor-recipient pair. The figures in Table 2, 
which are donor-level totals, are not used in the calculations, but are summaries for illustration. 
The final row of the table is an exception: it shows the flow for one donor-recipient pair, the 
United States and Colombia. I will continue the United States-Colombia in order to illustrate the 
actual calculations at the level of the donor-recipient pair.
6 
As described in section 4, the selectivity adjustment continues to exempt emergency aid 
from discounting and—new this year—applies different discounts to program and project aid. By 
“project aid” is meant funding for activities over which donors try to exercise detailed, ongoing 
control. “Program aid” is budget support, adjustment loans, debt relief, and sector-wide action 
programs (SWAPs)—aid over which the recipient ideally has near-complete control. Treating the 
three types of aid differently later necessitates splitting donors’ gross aid into three categories 
now and carrying the distinction through. 
Distinguishing emergency from non-emergency disbursements is easy since DAC pro-
vides this information in Table 2a of the DAC database. But to split non-emergency aid into pro-
ject from program flows, I had to turn to the Creditor Reporting System database, also main-
tained by DAC. The CRS has detailed information by aid commitment. In particular, it classifies 
commitments according to five-digit purpose codes. Table 1 shows the 36 purpose codes that I 
interpreted as program aid. The remaining 205 codes I treat as project aid, except for those be-
ginning with 7 (emergency aid) or 9 (miscellaneous items such as support to international 
                                                 
5 See http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,2340,en_2649_34447_2093101_1_1_1_1,00.html for lists of Part I and 
Part II countries. 
6 Unlike in 2003, administrative costs are not subtracted from bilateral flows. Last year, I argued that “large donor-
to-donor variations in their share of gross ODA may indicate inefficiencies. At any rate, netting out administrative 
costs gives a truer picture of the amount of aid reaching recipients, which is a legitimate basis for comparison.” 
(Roodman 2003a) But low administrative costs may also reflect lack of monitoring and evaluation, which can re-
duce aid quality. I am indebted to Mark McGillivray (2003) for making this point. NGOs).
7 Inevitably, the division is only approximate since some of the “program” codes may 
include project support and vice versa. Still, it seems likely that this categorization brings suseful 
information to the scoring of donors. 
In translating this commitments data to disbursements estimates, I assumed that for each 
donor-recipient pair, the project-program proportions are the same for commitments as dis-
bursements (leaving aside emergency aid). But in estimating this proportion for a given year’s 
disbursements, I used the last three years of commitments data. Commitments often lead to dis-
bursements over several years. Based on my examination of some extracts from the World 
Bank’s Development Gateway project database, it appears that projects last about three years on 
average. Thus for 2002, projects and programs receiving commitments in 2000–02 were assumed 
to be active. Implicitly, I assume that a commitment in year x leads to three equal disbursements 
in years x, x+1, and x+2. The splitting of 2002 disbursements at the donor level is also shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 1. Purpose codes in Creditor Reporting System database interpreted as program aid 
Purpose 
code  Purpose name  Purpose description 
11110 Education policy & 
admin. management 
Education sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to education ministries, administra-
tion and management systems; institution capacity building and advice; school management 
and governance; curriculum and materials development; unspecified education a 
12110 Health policy & admin. 
management 
Health sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to health ministries, public health ad-
ministration; institution capacity building and advice; medical insurance programmes; un-
specified health activities. 
13010 Population policy and 
admin. mgmt 
Population/development policies; census work, vital registration; migration data; demo-
graphic research/analysis; reproductive health research; unspecified population activities. 
14010 Water resources pol-
icy/admin. mgmt 
Water sector policy, planning and programmes; water legislation and management; institu-
tion capacity building and advice; water supply assessments and studies; groundwater, 
water quality and watershed studies; hydrogeology; excluding agricultural water re 
15010 Economic & dvpt pol-
icy/planning 
Macro-economic, fiscal and monetary policy and planning; social planning; economic and 
social analysis and forecasting; structural reforms; development planning; organisational 
development; support to ministries involved in aid co-ordination; other minist 
16110 Employment policy and 
admin. mgmt. 
Employment policy and planning; labour law; labour unions; institution capacity building and 
advice; support programmes for unemployed; employment creation and income generation 
programmes; occupational safety and health; combating child labour. 
16210 Housing policy and 
admin. management 
Housing sector policy, planning and programmes; excluding low-cost housing and slum 
clearance (16220). 
16310 Social/welfare services  Social legislation and administration; institution capacity building and advice; social security 
and other social schemes; special programmes for the elderly, orphans, the disabled, street 
children; social dimensions of structural adjustment; unspecified  
21010 Transport policy & 
admin. management 
Transport sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to transport ministries; institution 
capacity building and advice; unspecified transport; activities that combine road, rail, water 
and/or air transport. 
22010 Communications policy & 
admin. mgmt 
Communications sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and 
advice; including postal services development; unspecified communications activities. 
23010 Energy policy and admin. 
management 
Energy sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to energy ministries; institution capacity 
building and advice; unspecified energy activities including energy conservation. 
24010 Financial policy & admin. 
management 
Finance sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; 
financial markets and systems. 
25010 Business services  Support to trade and business associations, chambers of commerce; legal and regulatory 
reform aimed at improving business climate; private sector institution capacity building and 
advice. Where sector cannot be specified: general support to private secto 
31110 Agricultural policy & 
admin. mgmt 
Agricultural sector policy, planning and programmes; aid to agricultural ministries; institution 
capacity building and advice; unspecified agriculture. 
                                                 
7 There are two more exceptions: codes 51000 and 60000, which are super-category codes for program aid (as I de-
fine it), are not listed in Table 1 because they are not actually used in the CRS database. Purpose 
code  Purpose name  Purpose description 
31210 Forestry policy & admin. 
management 
Forestry sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; 
forest surveys; unspecified forestry and agro-forestry activities. 
31310 Fishing policy and admin. 
management 
Fishing sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; 
ocean and coastal fishing; marine and freshwater fish surveys and prospecting; fishing 
boats/equipment; unspecified fishing activities. 
32110 Industrial policy & admin. 
mgmt 
Industrial sector policy, planning and programmes; institution capacity building and advice; 
unspecified industrial activities; manufacturing of goods not specified below. 
32210 Mineral/mining policy & 
admin. mgmt 
Mineral and mining sector policy, planning and programmes; mining legislation, mining ca-
dastre, mineral resources inventory, information systems, institution capacity building and 
advice; unspecified mineral resources exploitation. 
32310 Construction policy and 
admin. mgmt 
Construction sector policy and planning; excluding construction activities within specific 
sectors (e.g., hospital or school construction). 
33110 Trade policy and admin. 
management 
Trade policy and planning; domestic marketing, trade, service industries, patents and 
trademarks. 
33210 Tourism policy and 
admin. management 
 
41010 Environmental policy and 
admin. mgmt 
Environmental policy, laws, regulations and economic instruments; administrational institu-
tions and practices; environmental and land use planning and decision-making procedures; 
seminars, meetings; miscellaneous conservation and protection measures not s 
42010 Women in development 
(including multisector. 
WID proj. & pro-
grammes) 
Including multisectoral WID projects and programmes; promotion of and support to WID 
groups and networks; conferences, seminars, etc. 
43010 Multisector aid 
51010 Structural adjustment  When not allocable by sector. 
52010 Food security pro-
grammes/food aid 
Supply of edible human food under national or international programmes including transport 
costs; cash payments made for food supplies; project food aid; food aid for market sales; 
excluding emergency food aid. 
53010 Balance-of-payments 
support 
Including general programme assistance (when not allocable by sector). 
53020 Budget support  Including administrative budget support. 
53030 Import support (capital 
goods) 
Capital goods and services; lines of credit. 
53040 Import support (com-
modities) 
Commodities, general goods and services, oil imports. 
60010 Action relating to debt  Actions falling outside the code headings below; training in debt management. 
60020 Debt forgiveness 
60030 Relief of multilateral debt  Grants or credits to cover debt owed to multilateral financial institutions; including contribu-
tions to HIPC Trust Fund. 
60040 Rescheduling and refinancing 
60050 Refinancing 
60063 Debt buy-back  Purchase of debt for the purpose of cancellation. Table 2. Gross aid by donor, with estimated breakdown by type, 2002 
Donor Total
  Project Program Emergency Project Program Emergency 
 ----------  (million $) ---------  --------- (percent) --------- 
Australia 777  495  184 98 64 24 13 
Austria 509  323  152 34 63 30 7 
Belgium 758  463  267 29 61 35 4 
Canada 1,633  823  618 191 50 38 12 
Denmark 1,178  788  281 110 67 24 9 
Finland 291  165  84 41 57 29 14 
France 5,624  2,216  3,125 284 39 56 5 
Germany 4,538  2,948  1,361 229 65 30 5 
Greece 123  106  10 7 86 8 5 
Ireland 268  182  69 17 68 26 6 
Italy 1,208  674  451 84 56 37 7 
Japan 9,811  6,732  3,042 36 69 31 0 
Luxembourg 119  106 0 13 89 0 11 
Netherlands 2,677  1,831  633 212 68 24 8 
New Zealand  92  81  0 11 88 0 12 
Norway 1,193  715  226 253 60 19 21 
Portugal 187  122  63 2 65 34 1 
Spain 1,164  866  266 32 74 23 3 
Sweden 1,351  743  304 304 55 23 22 
Switzerland 826  456  203 167 55 25 20 
United Kingdom  3,696  1,753  1,536 407 47 42 11 
United States  13,847  7,084  5,270 1,494 51 38 11 
AfDF 741  407  334 0 55 45 0 
Arab Agencies  300  300  0 0 100 0 0 
AsDF 1,168  862  307 0 74 26 0 
CarDB 119  119  0 0 100 0 0 
EBRD 72  72  0 0 100 0 0 
EC 10,145  6,660  2,945 540 66 29 5 
GEF 137  137  0 0 100 0 0 
IDA 6,667  3,000  3,666 0 45 55 0 
IDB Sp F  425  235  190 0 55 45 0 
IFAD 250  207  43 0 83 17 0 
Montreal Protocol  60  60  0 0 100 0 0 
Nordic Dev.Fund  35  35  0 0 100 0 0 
Other UN  630  630  0 0 100 0 0 
SAF+ESAF(IMF) 2,936 2,936  0 0 100 0 0 
UNDP 278  278  0 0 100 0 0 
UNFPA 312  312  0 0 100 0 0 
UNHCR 655  655  0 0 100 0 0 
UNICEF 571  477  94 0 84 16 0 
UNTA 478  478  0 0 100 0 0 
WFP 352  352  0 0 100 0 0 
             
U.S.-Colombia 346  322  23 0 93 7 0 
 
 2.  Subtracting debt service 
The next step is to net debt service out of gross aid flows. The computation is straightforward, 
and done in the belief that net transfers are a better measure of cost to the donor’s treasury and 
benefit to the recipient. This departs somewhat from the approach of the DAC, whose net 
ODA/OA statistic is net of principal payments (on concessional loans), but not interest pay-
ments. The rationale for the DAC approach appears to be an analogy with net foreign direct in-
vestment.
8 Only return of capital is netted out of net FDI, not repatriation of earnings. Similarly, 
only amortization is netted out of net ODA, not interest, which can be seen as the donors’ “earn-
ings” on aid investment. 
  I find the analogy inapt. In the case of FDI, return of capital can be expected to reduce the 
host country’s capital stock much more than repatriation of an equal amount of profits. Put oth-
erwise, when foreign corporations locally reinvest profits, they generally do increase the host 
country’s capital stock—and so net FDI counts local reinvestment as an additional flow. But 
when the government of Ghana sends a check to the government of Japan for $1 million, it 
hardly matters for either party whether it says “interest” or “principal” in the check’s memo field. 
It seems unlikely that interest and principal payments have different effects on Ghana’s capital 
stock and development.  
  Moreover, studies have found evidence of defensive lending on the part of bilateral and 
multilateral lenders, whereby new loans go to servicing old ones (Ratha 2001; Birdsall, Claes-
sens, and Diwan 2002). To the extent that donors are lending to cover interest payments they re-
ceive on concessional loans, net ODA counts the defensive disbursements as aid even though 
they are not really aid. 
For these reasons, the CDI aid index treats all debt service uniformly. “Net aid” is de-
fined simply as “gross aid” less debt service received on concessional loans. (See Table 3.) For 
purposes of the project/program/emergency categorization, debt service is treated as negative 
program aid since its opportunity cost should be a reduction in recipient governments’ discre-
tionary spending. Among bilateral donors, this adjustment to gross aid particularly affects Japan, 
which received $4.8 billion in debt service on concessional loans, equal to 49 percent of its gross 
aid. Among bilaterals, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States are also major recipients of 
debt service. Among multilaterals, the development banks are too, unsurprisingly. At the upper 
extreme, the Inter-American Development Bank’s Fund for Special Operations received debt 
service equal to 89% of disbursements. 
                                                 
8 I base this on an excellent exchange with Simon Scott, Principal Administrator of the Statistics and Monitoring 
Division of the OECD’s Development Co-operation Directorate, who I cannot assume was representing institutional 

















F. Of which, 
net program 
aid 
 ------------------- (million $) ------------------- 
Formula:     A–C–D B–C–D
Australia 777  184  0 0 777 184
Austria 509  152  3 2 504 147
Belgium 758  267  35 3 721 230
Canada 1,633  618  26 1 1,606 591
Denmark 1,178  281  45 9 1,124 227
Finland 291  84  7 0 283 76
France 5,624  3,125  947 0 4,678 2,178
Germany 4,538  1,361  945 356 3,237 60
Greece 123  10  0 0 123 10
Ireland 268  69  0 0 268 69
Italy 1,208  451  200 0 1,007 251
Japan 9,811  3,042  3,062 1,735 5,014 –1,755
Luxembourg 119  0  0 0 119 0
Netherlands 2,677  633  97 50 2,531 487
New Zealand  92  0  0 0 92 0
Norway 1,193  226  5 0 1,188 221
Portugal 187  63  0 1 186 63
Spain 1,164  266  154 1 1,009 111
Sweden 1,351  304  1 0 1,350 304
Switzerland 826  203  4 0 822 199
United Kingdom  3,696  1,536  102 2 3,592 1,432
United States  13,847  5,270  1,033 443 12,371 3,794
AfDF 741  334  125 97 519 112
Arab Agencies  300  0  159 0 141 –159
AsDF 1,168  307  262 156 750 –111
CarDB 119  0  56 36 27 –92
EBRD 72  0  0 0 72 0
EC 10,145  2,945  786 494 8,865 1,665
GEF 137  0  0 0 137 0
IDA 6,667  3,666  1,263 745 4,658 1,658
IDB Sp F  425  190  259 119 48 –187
IFAD 250  43  102 34 114 –93
Montreal Protocol  60  0  0 0 60 0
Nordic Dev.Fund  35  0  2 0 33 –2
Other UN  630  0  0 0 630 0
SAF+ESAF(IMF) 2,936  0  1,984 0 951 –1,984
UNDP 278  0  0 0 278 0
UNFPA 312  0  0 0 312 0
UNHCR 655  0  0 0 655 0
UNICEF 571  94  0 0 571 94
UNTA 478  0  0 0 478 0
WFP 352  0  0 0 352 0
    
U.S.-Colombia 346  23  39 2 305 –18
1From Table 2. 
   3.  Discounting tied aid 
Most bilateral donors tie some of their aid, which is to say, require the recipients to spend the 
money on goods and services from the donor’s home country, which reduces recipient govern-
ments’ freedom to shop for the best deals. Catrinus Jepma’s literature survey (1991, p. 58) found 
that tying raised the cost of aid projects a typical 15–30 percent. This suggests that tying reduces 
the value of aid by 13–23 percent.
9,10 
The DAC tying statistics put aid commitments in three tying status categories: untied, 
tied, and partially untied. “Partially untied aid” comes with restrictions, but ones that are looser 
than those of “tied aid.” By definition, partially untied aid is subject to the restriction that it must 
be spent on goods and services from the donor nation or developing countries, or else is re-
stricted to be spent on goods and services from developing countries only. In principle, the ap-
proach taken to penalizing tying is simple. Tied aid is discounted by 20 percent (a round number 
in the 13–23 percent range) and partially untied aid by half that, 10 percent. No attempt is made 
to account for unreported, informal, de facto tying that may often occur within long-term rela-
tionships between donors and recipients. 
In practice, the computation is more complex. Since the DAC tying statistics are for ODA 
only (not OA), it is assumed that donors tie or partially tie their OA and ODA in the same pro-
portions. Unlike in 2003, in 2004 I used the tying information from the detailed commitment-
level data in the CRS, and aggregated it up to the level of the donor-recipient pair. Since the data 
are for commitments, not disbursements, it is assumed that the same shares of disbursements and 
commitments are tied, untied, or partially untied. As with the project-program division, the trail-
ing three years of commitments data were used. Meanwhile, I maintained the program-project-
emergency distinction.
11 
Table 4 shows the results. Greece, Italy, Spain and the United States suffer most in rela-
tive terms from the tying discount. This table too summarizes calculations at the level of the do-
nor-recipient pair. The concrete U.S.-Colombia example is in the final row of the table.
12 
                                                 
9 Consider that a 15-percent cost increase lowers the purchasing power of aid by 1–1/1.15 = 13 percent. Similarly, a 
30-percent cost increase cuts the value of aid 23 percent. 
10 Unlike last year, I do not treat all technical cooperation as tied. Last year I used donor-level aggregated tying data 
from DAC Table 7b, which exclude technical cooperation and forced a default assumption about the tying status of 
technical assistance. This year, I used the detailed commitment-level data from the Creditor Reporting System data-
base, which shows which individual technical cooperation commitments donors actually report as tied. (Table 7b is 
also on a commitments basis, so the switch to the CRS database does not cause a change in this respect.) 
  Perhaps all technical cooperation ought to be assumed tied even if not reported as such. Or even if not, per-
haps all technical cooperation deemed tied should be discounted much more than Jepma’s (1991) figures suggest. 
Most, if not all, studies of how much tying raises costs have examined its effects on the prices of goods rather than 
services. Since foreign consultants typically cost a multiple of local ones, tying technical cooperation may reduce 
the value of aid much more than tying aid for goods, and may deserve separate treatment in the CDI. I deferred this 
issue to next year. 
11 For commitments that were missing tying status information, I used a number of backstops to estimate the tied 
fraction. If the donor was multilateral or the commitment was for debt forgiveness, I assumed the aid was untied. 
Otherwise, if at least part of the commitment was reported as technical cooperation, I took this as the tied share. 
Otherwise, I took the average tied share of all of a donor’s commitments, excluding debt forgiveness, for the most 
recently available year. 
12 The donor-level sums for the tying penalties in Table 4  are not simple sums of the underlying values at the donor-
recipient level. Using methods described in section 5, when the results were aggregated from the donor-recipient to 
the donor level, extrapolations were made to estimate the tying rate for aid flows otherwise lacking any tying infor-
mation, such as aid to “Far East Asia unallocated.” Table 4. Penalizing tied aid, 2002 
  Estimated disbursements Tying penalty 














 ----------  (million $) ---------- ------------ (million $) ---------- (%)  (million $) 
Australia 777  495  184 98 76 36 28 12 10  777 701
Austria 509  323  152 34 30 23 4 3 6  504 474
Belgium 758  463  267 29 7 6 1 0 1  721 714
Canada 1,633  823  618 191 118 53 64 0 7  1,606 1,488
Denmark 1,178  788  281 110 35 29 6 1 3  1,124 1,089
Finland 291  165  84 41 13 7 5 1 5  283 270
France 5,624  2,216  3,125 284 343 214 111 18 6  4,678 4,335
Germany 4,538  2,948  1,361 229 119 72 31 16 3  3,237 3,118
Greece 123  106  10 7 22 18 3 1 18  123 101
Ireland 268  182  69 17 0 0 0 0 0  268 268
Italy 1,208  674  451 84 196 115 66 15 16  1,007 811
Japan 9,811  6,732  3,042 36 197 190 7 0 2  5,014 4,817
Luxembourg 119  106  0 13 0 0 0 0 0  119 119
Netherlands 2,677  1,831  633 212 25 23 1 0 1  2,531 2,506
New Zealand  92  81  0 11 0 0 0 0 0  92 92
Norway 1,193  715  226 253 2 1 1 0 0  1,188 1,186
Portugal 187  122  63 2 13 11 2 0 7  186 173
Spain 1,164  866  266 32 178 95 56 27 15  1,009 831
Sweden 1,351  743  304 304 10 5 4 0 1  1,350 1,340
Switzerland 826  456  203 167 2 0 1 0 0  822 820
United Kingdom  3,696  1,753 1,536 407 24 14 8 2 1  3,592 3,568
United States  13,847  7,084 5,270 1,4941,971 860 906 205 14  12,371 10,400
AfDF 741  407  334 0 0 0 0 0 0  519 519
Arab Agencies  300  300  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  141 141
AsDF 1,168  862  307 0 0 0 0 0 0  750 750
CarDB 119  119  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  27 27
EBRD 72  72  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  72 72
EC 10,145  6,660  2,945 540 0 0 0 0 0  8,865 8,865
GEF 137  137  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  137 137
IDA 6,667  3,000  3,666 0 0 0 0 0 0  4,658 4,658
IDB Sp F  425  235  190 0 0 0 0 0 0  48 48
IFAD 250  207  43 0 0 0 0 0 0  114 114
Mont. Protocol  60  60  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  60 60
Nordic Dev.Fund  35  35  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  33 33
Other UN  630  630  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  630 630
SAF+ESAF(IMF) 2,936 2,936  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  951 951
UNDP 278  278  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  278 278
UNFPA 312  312  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  312 312
UNHCR 655  655  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  655 655
UNICEF 571  477  94 0 0 0 0 0 0  571 571
UNTA 478  478  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  478 478
WFP 352  352  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  352 352
      
U.S.-Colombia 346  322  23 0 49 46 3 0 14  305 256
 
 4.  Adjusting for selectivity 
The most complex part of the aid component is the adjustment for selectivity. It has long been 
argued that an important determinants of aid effectiveness is which country the aid goes to (East-
erly 2002, p. 35). Some countries need it more than others. Some countries can use it better than 
others—or offer an environment in which it will be more effective. There is little empirically 
grounded consensus, however, on what precisely donors should select for. And Steven Radelet 
(2004) argues the question is more complicated than that: how donors allocate aid among coun-
tries should depend on the type of aid. 
For anyone measuring selectivity, two main challenges arise: choosing a mathematical 
structure to distill numbers on recipient attributes and donor aid allocations into a metric; and 
choosing the attributes that donors are expected to select for, such as low income, good policies, 
or good governance. I will discuss my choices at the level of principle, then descend to the de-
tails of implementation. 
Principles 
The oldest approach to measuring selectivity—even if not always thought of as such—is the use 
of cross-country regressions to explain donors’ aid allocations as a function of recipient charac-
teristics indicating geopolitical importance (e.g, oil exports or military expenditure), commercial 
value (trade with donors), and development need and potential (income, governance) (Kaplan 
1975; Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; McKinley and Little 1979; Mosley 1981, 1985; Maizels 
and Nissanke 1984; Frey and Schneider 1986; Gang and Lehman 1990; Schraeder, Hook, and 
Taylor 1998; Trumbull and Wall 1994; Alesina and Dollar 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Col-
lier and Dollar 2002; Birdsall, Claessens, and Diwan 2002). In general, bilateral donors appear 
from the studies to have been less sensitive to recipient need and potential than to geostrategic 
and commercial concerns. More fragmentary evidence suggests that multilaterals have been 
somewhat opposite. Almost all the studies that checked found a widespread bias in favor of small 
countries, in the sense that the elasticity of aid receipts with respect to population is less than 1. 
The cross-country regression approach to measuring selectivity is conceptually consis-
tent, but it does invite methodological challenges that it might be better to avoid with a simpler 
approach. This is because it embodies an attempt to model donor decision-making and predict 
the effects on allocations of marginal changes in recipient characteristics, all else equal. With 
modeling comes the risk of misspecification. If a donor’s aid allocations fail to relate to the cho-
sen variables via the chosen functional form, the results may not be meaningful. For example, if 
a donor specializes in one region, such as France in francophone Africa, its aid allocations will 
be highly nonlinear with respect to most indicators of recipient appropriateness. Similarly if a 
donor specializes exclusively in the poorest nations. Results may also be sensitive to the choice 
of regressors. The United States gives large amounts of aid to countries such as Russia and Paki-
stan that appear too poorly governed to make good use of aid for development. As a result, re-
gressions that control for geopolitical value may yield a different coefficient on governance for 
the United States from regressions that do not. This then raises the question of whether evalua-
tions of selectivity should abstract from donors’ responsiveness to non-development concerns. 
Controlling for non-development concerns gives a better picture of the effects of a hypothetical 
marginal change in an indicator of recipient development potential. Not controlling for it gives a 
better picture of the general importance of development potential in allocation. It is a question, in 
other words, of what is meant by “selectivity.” The new paper by David Dollar and Victoria Levin (2004) stands in this tradition and 
faces some of these questions. The authors estimate the elasticity of a donor’s aid disbursements 
with respect to recipient’s income and governance. They answer the question with a regression 
without controls for commercial or geopolitical interests. It is a log-linear regression of dis-
bursements on recipient population, GDP/capita, and “institutions/policies” as indicated by the 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. Notably, they choose not to control 
for donor interest variables. They do, however, abstract from the small-country bias by control-
ling for population even though Collier and Dollar (2002) found that global aid could reduce 
poverty twice as fast if most of it were reallocated to India. 
The Dollar and Levin specification also has a problem that is relatively specific to it, yet 
illustrates the general risk that comes with modeling. In the elasticity framework, no recipient 
receives zero aid from any donor—rising income or falling governance cause percentage reduc-
tions in aid, but never bring it to zero. Yet 1,523 out of the 4,914 the potential donor-recipient 
pairs in the DAC database show zero disbursements for 2002 by my count.
13 The conflict be-
tween theory and reality appears when Dollar and Levin attempt, as it were, to take the loga-
rithms of these zeroes in order to perform their log-linear regressions. To avoid infinities, they 
replace zeroes with a small number, $10,000, or $0.01 million. But in logs, 0.01 becomes –4.6. 
For comparison, the largest gross flow in 2002, $1.3 billion from Japan to China, has a log of 
7.2. If Dollar and Levin had replaced zeroes with $100 (with a log of –9.2) or $1 (–13.8) they 
might have gotten different results. An alternative specification that directly confronts the possi-
bility that the distribution of aid disbursements is truncated, such as tobit specification, may be 
more appropriate. Below, I compare my results to theirs.  
The second major approach to evaluating selectivity was initiated by McGillivray (1989, 
1992). It is more radically empirical, eschewing any attempt to model allocation procedures or 
estimate marginal effects, and lends itself more naturally to creating an index that reflects quan-
tity and selectivity. His index is, essentially, the weighted sum of a donor’s aid disbursements to 
all recipients, where the weights are mathematically related to a recipient characteristic such as 
GDP/capita. If the weights lie between 0 and 1, they can be thought of as discounts that penalize 
or reward selection for desired characteristics. The ratio of the weighted index to the raw, un-
weighted sum in then a straightforward measure of overall selectivity.
14 
Rao (1994, 1997) pointed out that donors could maximize their scores on McGillivray’s 
index by concentrating all their aid in the single poorest country. He argued that the source of 
this perverse result was the failure to consider recipients’ post-aid GDP/capita. On the assump-
tion that aid leads directly to GDP gains, if all aid went to the poorest country, that country’s 
GDP/capita would rise rapidly and make it a less deserving recipient. He revised McGillivray’s 
index to factor in both pre- and post-aid GDP. This introduced a notion of diminishing returns to 
aid, albeit an odd one: not diminishing returns to the effectiveness of aid in raising GDP/capita, 
but diminishing returns to the value of doing so. 
The third approach to assessing selectivity is the newest and most sophisticated. Drawing 
on the cross-country literature on determinants of aid allocation, McGillivray, Leavy, and White 
                                                 
13 This excludes recipients lacking GDP, population, or (1999) CPIA data, and excludes three atypical donors: Arab 
Agencies, the Montreal Protocol fund, and the Caribbean Development Bank. 
14 McGillivray’s original (1989) index summed aid/recipient population rather than total aid to each recipient. White 
(1992) questioned the implicit notion of donors “allocating” aid/recipient population: shifting $1 million in aid from 
small, poor Mali to large, poor India would reduce a donor’s score in McGillivray’s system because the aid would 
be lower per capita in India. In reply, McGillivray (1992) proposed using absolute aid rather than aid/capita, within 
the same basic framework. (2002), formally model aid allocation. They endow donors with utility functions that depend on 
their allocation of aid among recipients of various commercial and geopolitical values, as well as 
levels of development need and potential; incorporate diminishing returns to aid; compute opti-
mal allocations; and penalize donors to the extent they deviate from their optima. The approach 
has several disadvantages from the point of view of the CDI. It is conceptually complex. It is 
vulnerable to challenges analogous to those that apply to the first approach, regarding proper 
specification. It rewards donors for consistently pursuing geopolitical and commercial interests 
(though this could be easily changed). And it penalizes donors for aid allocations that are rather 
different from the ideal ones even if they do not generate much lower utility. For example, if a 
donor at the optimal allocation shifts aid between two identical recipients, the marginal utility 
cost is zero, but the marginal decline in the donor’s score would be non-zero. 
The approach I have taken is closest to McGillivray’s original. For the purposes of the 
CDI, it has the advantages of conceptual simplicity—it combines quantity and quality (selectiv-
ity) in a natural way—and sticking to observable facts, thus avoiding questions about proper 
modeling specification. Since it does not model with smooth functional forms, it does not inher-
ently penalize specialization in a certain region or income bracket. It lends itself to a distin-
guishig between subflows of aid (project, program, emergency). And it can handle net transfers 
even when they are negative, where some of the common functional forms cannot. (Reverse 
flows, like zero flows, would bedevil the elasticity approach of Dollar and Levin, for example.) 
Here is a simple example of how the chosen system works. The selectivity formula intro-
duced here, it will emerge, assigns Malawi a weight of 0.9 for project aid and Kuwait a 0.1. A 
donor that gave $1 million to each of these countries and no aid elsewhere would have selectiv-
ity-weighted aid of $1 million (0.9 × $1 million = $0.9 million for Malawi and 0.1 × $1 million = 
$0.1 million for Kuwait). The donor’s “selectivity” is then the ratio of its selectivity-weighted aid 
to its unweighted aid—in this case 0.5. This is also the average selectivity weight of the donor’s 
recipients, where the average is weighted by how much aid the donor gives to each recipient. 
One potentially counterintuitive result of this approach, as with any approach that judges 
donors with reference to the same, full universe of recipients, is that a donor that is constitution-
ally confined to a clientele with low selectivity weights comes off poorly even if it is in some 
sense selective within that pool. The best example is the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, which lends to the (relatively rich) nations of the former Eastern bloc. But for 
purposes of comparing bilateral donors to each other, this is actually as it should be. As will be 
described below, the “quality-adjusted aid quantities” of multilaterals are ultimately allocated 
back as credits to the bilaterals. If Germany is to be more rewarded for giving aid to Malawi than 
Poland, it should also be more rewarded for doing the same indirectly—giving more to the Afri-
can Development Fund than the EBRD. 
Having settled the question of mathematical form for measuring selectivity, there remains 
the question of what donors are supposed to select for. I use two indicators. The first is 
GDP/capita (converted to dollars on the basis of purchasing power parities). The second is the 
composite governance variable of Daniel Kaufman and Aart Kraay (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mas-
truzzi 2003), which is the most comprehensive governance indicator available. The KK compos-
ite is an average of indicators on up to six dimensions, available data permitting: democracy, po-
litical instability, rule of law, bureaucratic regulation, government effectiveness, and corruption. 
The six variables are themselves synthesized from several hundred primary variables from 24 
datasets. GDP/capita and the KK composite have several strengths for measuring selectivity. 
They have wide coverage (177 countries for PPP GDP/capita for 2002 in the World Bank World Development Indicators database and 199 for the KK composite, including rich countries). They 
are updated regularly and made freely available. And they reflect consensus views that a) the 
richer a country is, the less it needs aid; and b) that institutional quality is a key determinant of 
development and, most likely, aid effectiveness. Notably, Craig Burnside and David Dollar, in 
their 2004 reprise on their influential finding that “aid works in a good policy environment,” 
have switched from economic policy variables to the KK composite to measure “poli-
cies/institutions.” 
In factoring governance into the weighting, the formula distinguishes between program 
and project aid. It gives governance more influence in the weight for program aid because, re-
cipient governments should in fact exercise more influence over program aid. The greater recipi-
ent ownership allowed by program aid can be expected to be healthy in the best-governed coun-
tries, the icon being Chile, and counterproductive in the worst-governed, epitomized by the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo.
15 This embodies the advice of Radelet (2004): “donors should pro-
vide a greater share their financing as programmatic or budget support in well-governed coun-
tries, while primarily (or even exclusively) using project financing in poorly governed coun-
tries.” 
Before descending to particulars, it is worth reiterating that two concepts are defined here 
relating to selectivity. The first, selectivity-weighted aid, is a measure of aid allocations that 
blends quantity and quality, and is of primary interest for grading performance. It possesses the 
desirable properties of linearity. If a country doubles its aid to every recipient, selectivity-
adjusted aid score will exactly double. If it runs two parallel aid programs, the quality-adjusted 
aid score of the combination is the sum of the scores for the individual programs.  
The second concept is the weighted-average selectivity score of a donor’s recipients—the 
donor’s “selectivity.” This measure, it must be noted, behaves strangely when it is applied to do-
nors with net transfers much smaller than gross transfers. Consider this example. Donor X is a 
development bank. It disburses nothing to Recipient Y, which has program selectivity weight 
0.6, but receives $1 million from Y in debt service, which is treated as negative program aid. It 
disburses the $1 million, as program aid, to Recipient Z, which has weight 0.8 for this kind of 
aid. Donor X’s selectivity-weighted aid is thus: 
 
0.6 × (–$1 million) + 0.8 × ($1 million) = $0.2 million. 
Its score is small but positive because it has transferred funds from a less appropriate to a more 
appropriate aid “recipient”—perhaps an odd result, but meaningful. Now, what is the “selectiv-
ity” of Donor X? 
 
selectivity-weighted net transfers / total net transfers = $0.2 million / 0 = ∞. 
The donor has done some good for the developing world on net, according to the measure, with 
zero net disbursal of funds. It is infinitely efficient. 
                                                 
15 This is a significant change from last year, at least at the conceptual level. Last year the selectivity formula used 
the KK score controlling for income because “poorer countries generally have poorer governance, so it is inconsis-
tent to expect donors to select simultaneously for low income and high governance quality.” I changed this for two 
reasons. First, it was not clear that low governance (on absolute scale) was less damaging to aid effectiveness in a 
very poor country than in a rich one. Second, it became difficult to maintain the old mathematical structure while 
introducing the distinction between program and project aid described. This extreme example illustrates a counterintuitive result for donors whose net transfers 
are much smaller than gross transfers (because of debt service). In these cases, the donor’s re-
ported “selectivity” can lie well outside the range of its recipients’ selectivity weights. For ex-
ample, the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations disbursed $425 million in 2002. It received $378 
million in debt service, for a net aid of only $48 million. Yet it generally transferred funds from 
countries deemed less appropriate for aid to those deemed more appropriate and so achieved a 
selectivity score of 1.28 in 2002—not infinite, but higher than the selectivity weight of every re-
cipient. Mathematically, the 1.28 is still a weighted average of selectivity factors between 0 and 
1, but some of those weights (net transfers) are negative. 
One can avoid such results by measuring selectivity of gross disbursements only, which I 
call “gross selectivity.” In the abstract example above, Donor X has gross selectivity of $0.2 mil-
lion/$1 million = 0.2—a small but positive value. This result seems more meaningful than infin-
ity, but comes at the expense of ignoring the debt service received from Recipient Y. 
The sometimes-strange behavior of the preferred selectivity measure introduced here, 
which I call “net selectivity,” does not mean it is inherently flawed. Rather, it points up another 
subtlety in the question of what is meant by selectivity. The picture conjured by the word “selec-
tivity” is of a donor that only sends funds outward. In fact, donors not only distribute their own 
money but redistribute that of recipients. What does selectivity mean in such a context? Is a do-
nor that bestows all its net transfers on Malawi almost perfectly selective? Or is it falling far 
short of the theoretical ideal by failing to transfer billions of dollars from Kuwait to Malawi? 
To repeat, these questions are important for understanding how to measure selectivity of 
donors, but their answers to do not affect the present exercise. In the present framework, what 
matters most for comparing donors is the index, selectivity-weighted net aid, and this is not sub-
ject to the same conceptual problems, the same infinities. In the above example, $0.2 million is a 
meaningful value for selectivity-weighted net aid. 
Implementation 
The flow to which selectivity weights are applied is the output of the previous step in the con-
struction of the aid performance measure, namely “tying-discounted net aid.” Project, program, 
and emergency aid are treated separately because how appropriate a country is for aid depends 
not only on its income, governance, etc., but also on the type of aid. Some forms of aid may 
work better in countries that seem unpromising for aid. And some forms of aid will work better 
than others within a given country, depending on recipient characteristics such as governance 
quality. The coarse three-way division is meant to acknowledge the complexity of aid giving in a 
way that is practical given the available data. 
To be precise, emergency aid is completely exempted from discounting since it may be 
quite appropriate for even poorly governed or middle-income countries. Project and program aid 
are discounted; separate factors reflecting income and governance are multiplied to produce a 
single combined factor for each recipient and aid type. The governance factor is linearly related 
to a country’s KK governance score. For project aid, it ranges by design between 0.25 and 
0.75.
16 The country with the lowest governance score, the Democratic Republic of Congo, de-
fines the bottom of that range, getting the 0.25, while Chile anchors the top. For program aid, the 
scale is stretched to 0.0–1.0. (See Figure 1.) Thus aid to better-governed countries is favored 
                                                 
16 This is for 2002. In back-calculating the index I use the same linear transformation, for comparability over a time, 
and should do the same for coming years. So the weight ranges shift somewhat over time. over aid to worse-governed countries, all else equal, be it project or program aid. And within any 
given country the preference between project and program aid depends on its governance. In 
Chile, project aid is discounted relative to program aid (a multiplier of 0.75 instead of 1.0) while 
the opposite is true in the DRC (0.25 instead of 0.0). 
  The second factor is a linear function of a country’s log real 2002 GDP/capita. Hong 
Kong (GDP/capita of $23,200) gets a 0 and Sierra Leone, the poorest country with data (real 
GDP/capita of $450), defines the upper end. (See Figure 2.) This upper end is not 1.0, as one 
might expect, but 1.96, a number chosen so that the highest combined selectivity weight (the 
product of the governance and income factors) for either program or project aid, is 1.0. (It hap-
pens to be for program aid to Madagascar.)
17 Table 5 summarizes the weight computations.
18 
This system implies several valuations, which are meant to be minimally arbitrary. First, 
non-emergency program aid to the highest-weighted recipient (in 2002, Madagascar) is precisely 
as meritorious as emergency aid to any country, since the latter is not discounted. All other aid is 
valued less. Second, because of the multiplicative weighting structure, non-emergency aid to the 
richest country is valueless no matter how well-governed it is: by virtue of being the richest its 
income weight is zero. Similarly, program aid to the worst-governed country is also valueless 
regardless of how poor it is. Governance quality and income level are each seen as conditioning 
the other’s relevance for aid effectiveness. 
Last year, the weights were computed differently. They were a linear function of log real 
GDP/capita and KK score controlling for log real GDP/capita, and were confined by design to 
0.5–1.0. Thus governance and income were combined additively rather than multiplicatively, and 
weights were generally higher. Since the purpose of this index is to compare donors to each 
other, an across-the-board lowering of weights should not affect results much—only to the extent 
that donors differ in how much emergency aid they give, since lower weights give undiscounted 
emergency aid more relative value. Indeed, a sensitivity test (Roodman 2003x) showed that rang-
ing the weights between 0.0 and 1.0 in last year’s system had little effect on the results. It does 
render meaningless and direct comparison with last year’s results (in % of GDP terms). 
The real test of any such weighting system is whether its results match priors. That is for 
the reader to judge. Overall, the new weighting system shows a fairly strong correspondence to 
the old one. 
 Figure 3 is a scatter plot of this year’s project weights against the weights from last 
year’s system (which did not distinguish between project and program aid). For comparability, 
the figure uses the 2001 data that went into last year’s aid component. The correlation is 0.92. 
Figure 4 does the same for the new program aid weights, in which governance plays a larger 
role; the correlation here is 0.74. Evidently governance is a larger source of variation in the pro-
gram weights this year than it was in the overall weights last year. 
                                                 
17 One can also think of this as setting the upper end for income weights at 1.0, then multiplying them by the gov-
ernance weights for program and project aid, and then multiplying all the combined weights by 1.96 so that the final 
set of weights does range between 0 and 1. 
18 Because of a programming error I discovered after the 2004 Commitment to Development Index numbers were 
frozen, income factors were scaled so that Sierra Leone got a 2.27 rather than 1.96. As a result, the maximum com-
bined factor (for program aid to Madagascar) was 1.16 rather than 1.0. I switched to 1.96 in this paper not because I 
believe it is more correct, but because it is less arbitrary. The rescaling causes an across-the-board 13.7% reduction 
in the value of non-emergency selectivity-weighted aid. Were it not for the exemption of emergency aid from 
weighting, this change would have no effect on relative scores for official aid performance. But because of this ex-
emption, the relative standing of countries that gave emergency aid disproportionately in 2002—notably top-ranked 
Sweden—improves slightly. The results of applying the weights to tying-discounted net aid for 2002 are in the next 
section. 
  
Figure 1. Illustration of governance selectivity weight computation, 2002 
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Table 5. Computation of selectivity weights 
Country name 
 A. Real 
GDP/capita, 
2002 ($)  































Formula:   Log  A 
(linear map 
of B to 0–
2.27 range)  
(linear map 
of D to 0.25–
0.75 range)
(linear map 
of D to 0–1 
range)  C × E  C × F 
Madagascar        650  6.48 1.78 –0.07 0.53 0.56  0.94 1.00
Mongolia     1,462  7.29 1.38 0.21 0.58 0.65  0.79 0.90
Malawi        519  6.25 1.89 –0.42 0.47 0.45  0.90 0.85
Benin        913  6.82 1.61 –0.26 0.50 0.50  0.81 0.81
Mali        777  6.66 1.69 –0.35 0.49 0.47  0.82 0.80
Mauritania     1,337  7.20 1.42 –0.08 0.53 0.56  0.75 0.79
Tanzania        493  6.20 1.92 –0.54 0.46 0.41  0.88 0.79
Burkina Faso        896  6.80 1.62 –0.31 0.49 0.49  0.80 0.79
Senegal     1,359  7.21 1.41 –0.16 0.52 0.53  0.73 0.75
Mozambique     1,009  6.92 1.56 –0.40 0.48 0.46  0.75 0.71
Zambia        713  6.57 1.73 –0.57 0.45 0.40  0.78 0.69
Ghana     1,815  7.50 1.27 –0.16 0.52 0.54  0.66 0.68
Niger        685  6.53 1.75 –0.64 0.44 0.38  0.77 0.67
Moldova     1,267  7.14 1.45 –0.43 0.47 0.45  0.68 0.65
Dominica     4,660  8.45 0.80 0.65 0.65 0.80  0.52 0.64
Lesotho     2,011  7.61 1.22 –0.21 0.51 0.52  0.62 0.63
India     2,276  7.73 1.16 –0.19 0.51 0.53  0.59 0.61
Eritrea        848  6.74 1.65 –0.73 0.43 0.35  0.70 0.58
ST. VINCENT AND GR.     4,748  8.47 0.79 0.42 0.61 0.72  0.48 0.57
Samoa     4,757  8.47 0.79 0.42 0.61 0.72  0.48 0.57
Ethiopia        641  6.46 1.79 –0.84 0.41 0.32  0.73 0.56Country name 
 A. Real 
GDP/capita, 
2002 ($)  































Gambia     1,525  7.33 1.35 –0.53 0.46 0.42  0.62 0.56
Bolivia     2,089  7.64 1.20 –0.38 0.48 0.46  0.58 0.56
Jamaica     3,341  8.11 0.96 –0.03 0.54 0.58  0.52 0.56
Cape Verde     4,238  8.35 0.85 0.22 0.58 0.66  0.49 0.56
Vanuatu     2,485  7.82 1.11 –0.27 0.50 0.50  0.56 0.55
Nepal     1,171  7.07 1.49 –0.66 0.44 0.37  0.65 0.55
Sri Lanka     3,052  8.02 1.01 –0.12 0.52 0.55  0.53 0.55
Guinea-Bissau        689  6.54 1.75 –0.84 0.41 0.32  0.71 0.55
Morocco     3,335  8.11 0.97 –0.05 0.54 0.57  0.52 0.55
St. Lucia     4,857  8.49 0.78 0.37 0.60 0.71  0.47 0.55
Cambodia     1,459  7.29 1.38 –0.59 0.45 0.39  0.62 0.54
Jordan     3,634  8.20 0.92 –0.01 0.54 0.58  0.50 0.54
Kenya        878  6.78 1.63 –0.81 0.41 0.32  0.67 0.53
Viet Nam     1,982  7.59 1.22 –0.48 0.46 0.43  0.57 0.53
Uganda     1,199  7.09 1.47 –0.74 0.42 0.35  0.63 0.51
Togo     1,291  7.16 1.44 –0.72 0.43 0.35  0.61 0.51
Comoros     1,452  7.28 1.38 –0.69 0.43 0.36  0.60 0.50
Chile     8,463  9.04 0.50 1.28 0.75 1.00  0.38 0.50
Honduras     2,231  7.71 1.17 –0.49 0.46 0.43  0.54 0.50
Armenia     2,618  7.87 1.09 –0.40 0.48 0.46  0.52 0.50
Yemen        693  6.54 1.75 –0.94 0.39 0.28  0.68 0.49
Grenada     6,186  8.73 0.66 0.50 0.62 0.75  0.41 0.49
Solomon Islands     1,342  7.20 1.42 –0.75 0.42 0.35  0.60 0.49
Belize     5,229  8.56 0.74 0.22 0.58 0.66  0.43 0.49
Namibia     5,674  8.64 0.70 0.32 0.59 0.69  0.42 0.48
Philippines     3,560  8.18 0.93 –0.22 0.51 0.52  0.47 0.48
Botswana     7,298  8.90 0.58 0.77 0.67 0.84  0.38 0.48
Costa Rica     7,497  8.92 0.56 0.81 0.67 0.85  0.38 0.48
Papua New Guinea     1,895  7.55 1.25 –0.64 0.44 0.38  0.55 0.47
Panama     5,286  8.57 0.74 0.16 0.57 0.64  0.42 0.47
Guyana     3,617  8.19 0.93 –0.25 0.50 0.51  0.47 0.47
Egypt     3,276  8.09 0.97 –0.37 0.48 0.47  0.47 0.46
Fiji     4,733  8.46 0.79 –0.03 0.54 0.58  0.43 0.46
Djibouti     1,795  7.49 1.27 –0.71 0.43 0.36  0.55 0.45
El Salvador     4,138  8.33 0.86 –0.18 0.51 0.53  0.44 0.45
Bangladesh     1,537  7.34 1.35 –0.78 0.42 0.34  0.56 0.45
Thailand     6,009  8.70 0.67 0.25 0.58 0.67  0.39 0.45
Bulgaria     6,115  8.72 0.66 0.26 0.58 0.67  0.39 0.44
Kyrgyz Rep.     1,391  7.24 1.40 –0.85 0.41 0.31  0.57 0.44
Peru     4,358  8.38 0.83 –0.22 0.51 0.51  0.42 0.43
Tunisia     5,824  8.67 0.69 0.11 0.56 0.62  0.39 0.43
Latvia     7,935  8.98 0.53 0.64 0.65 0.79  0.34 0.42
China     3,961  8.28 0.88 –0.34 0.49 0.48  0.43 0.42
Romania     5,600  8.63 0.71 0.01 0.54 0.59  0.39 0.42
Sierra Leone        451  6.11 1.96 –1.16 0.36 0.21  0.70 0.41
Lebanon     3,756  8.23 0.91 –0.44 0.47 0.44  0.43 0.40
Pakistan     1,783  7.49 1.28 –0.84 0.41 0.31  0.52 0.40
Cameroon     1,515  7.32 1.36 –0.91 0.40 0.29  0.54 0.40
Guatemala     3,476  8.15 0.94 –0.53 0.46 0.42  0.43 0.39
Swaziland     3,986  8.29 0.88 –0.43 0.47 0.45  0.42 0.39
Albania     3,517  8.17 0.94 –0.52 0.46 0.42  0.43 0.39
Rwanda     1,081  6.99 1.53 –1.02 0.38 0.26  0.58 0.39
Malaysia     7,897  8.97 0.54 0.45 0.62 0.73  0.33 0.39
Lithuania     8,865  9.09 0.48 0.69 0.65 0.81  0.31 0.39
Syria     2,996  8.01 1.02 –0.66 0.44 0.37  0.45 0.38
Dominican Republic     5,486  8.61 0.72 –0.17 0.52 0.53  0.37 0.38
Chad        892  6.79 1.62 –1.09 0.37 0.23  0.60 0.38
Ecuador     3,050  8.02 1.01 –0.66 0.44 0.37  0.44 0.38
Brazil     6,653  8.80 0.62 0.02 0.55 0.59  0.34 0.37Country name 
 A. Real 
GDP/capita, 
2002 ($)  































Mauritius     9,321  9.14 0.45 0.70 0.66 0.81  0.30 0.37
Trinidad & Tobago     8,067  9.00 0.53 0.34 0.60 0.69  0.31 0.37
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA     9,379  9.15 0.45 0.68 0.65 0.81  0.29 0.36
Estonia   10,367  9.25 0.40 0.94 0.69 0.89  0.28 0.36
Gabon     5,621  8.63 0.71 –0.28 0.50 0.50  0.35 0.35
Tajikistan        811  6.70 1.67 –1.17 0.35 0.21  0.59 0.35
Laos     1,485  7.30 1.37 –1.03 0.38 0.25  0.51 0.35
Mexico     7,707  8.95 0.55 0.13 0.56 0.63  0.31 0.34
Central African Rep.     1,061  6.97 1.54 –1.13 0.36 0.22  0.55 0.34
Guinea     1,793  7.49 1.27 –0.99 0.38 0.27  0.49 0.34
Nigeria        753  6.62 1.71 –1.20 0.35 0.20  0.60 0.34
Ukraine     4,173  8.34 0.85 –0.59 0.45 0.39  0.38 0.34
South Africa     8,969  9.10 0.47 0.39 0.61 0.71  0.29 0.34
Indonesia     2,778  7.93 1.06 –0.84 0.41 0.31  0.43 0.33
Congo, Rep.        856  6.75 1.64 –1.19 0.35 0.20  0.58 0.33
Malta   11,649  9.36 0.34 1.16 0.73 0.96  0.25 0.33
Cote d'Ivoire     1,328  7.19 1.42 –1.10 0.37 0.23  0.52 0.33
Croatia     8,823  9.09 0.48 0.29 0.59 0.68  0.28 0.33
Georgia     1,939  7.57 1.24 –1.00 0.38 0.26  0.47 0.33
Uruguay   10,727  9.28 0.38 0.70 0.66 0.81  0.25 0.31
FYROM-Macedonia     5,543  8.62 0.71 –0.48 0.47 0.43  0.33 0.31
Hungary   11,621  9.36 0.34 0.96 0.70 0.89  0.24 0.31
St. Kitts-Nevis     9,599  9.17 0.44 0.35 0.60 0.70  0.26 0.31
Azerbaijan     2,757  7.92 1.06 –0.96 0.39 0.28  0.41 0.29
Tonga     5,634  8.64 0.70 –0.54 0.46 0.41  0.32 0.29
KAZAKHSTAN     5,106  8.54 0.75 –0.67 0.43 0.37  0.33 0.28
Colombia     5,371  8.59 0.73 –0.66 0.44 0.37  0.32 0.27
Bosnia-Herzegovina     4,902  8.50 0.77 –0.73 0.42 0.35  0.33 0.27
Uzbekistan     1,426  7.26 1.39 –1.22 0.35 0.19  0.48 0.27
Barbados   13,774  9.53 0.26 1.24 0.74 0.98  0.19 0.26
Burundi        543  6.30 1.87 –1.40 0.32 0.14  0.59 0.25
Algeria     4,901  8.50 0.77 –0.81 0.41 0.32  0.32 0.25
Iran     5,611  8.63 0.71 –0.73 0.43 0.35  0.30 0.25
Russia     7,016  8.86 0.60 –0.55 0.45 0.41  0.27 0.24
Venezuela     4,626  8.44 0.80 –0.88 0.40 0.30  0.32 0.24
Paraguay     3,912  8.27 0.89 –1.01 0.38 0.26  0.34 0.23
Belarus     4,730  8.46 0.79 –0.98 0.39 0.27  0.31 0.21
Saudi Arabia   11,800  9.38 0.34 –0.05 0.53 0.57  0.18 0.19
Zimbabwe     2,018  7.61 1.22 –1.34 0.33 0.15  0.40 0.19
Angola     1,817  7.50 1.27 –1.36 0.32 0.15  0.41 0.19
Haiti     1,397  7.24 1.40 –1.40 0.32 0.13  0.44 0.19
Bahrain   14,216  9.56 0.24 0.53 0.63 0.76  0.15 0.18
Argentina     9,378  9.15 0.45 –0.58 0.45 0.40  0.20 0.18
Slovenia   15,711  9.66 0.19 0.99 0.70 0.90  0.14 0.18
Sudan     1,741  7.46 1.29 –1.40 0.32 0.14  0.41 0.17
Turkmenistan     4,091  8.32 0.86 –1.30 0.33 0.17  0.29 0.14
Kuwait   16,553  9.71 0.17 0.36 0.60 0.70  0.10 0.12
Israel   17,518  9.77 0.14 0.56 0.63 0.77  0.09 0.11
Cyprus   18,757  9.84 0.11 0.88 0.68 0.87  0.07 0.09
Macao   19,147  9.86 0.10 0.53 0.63 0.76  0.06 0.07
CONGO, DEM.REP.        537  6.29 1.87 –1.82 0.25 0.00  0.47 0.00
Hong Kong, China   23,223  10.05 0.00 1.16 0.73 0.96  0.00 0.00
 Figure 3. Comparisons of overall weights in 2003 system with project weights in 2004 sys-
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 5.  Aggregation to the donor level 
In the 2004 methodology, one more quality adjustment still needs to be made—for project pro-
liferation. But for reasons described below, this occurs after the results of the previous step—
selectivity-weighted, tying-discounted net aid by donor and recipient—are aggregated up to the 
level of the donor.  
  In principle, this aggregation is matter of simple sums. But data problems intrude. Not all 
aid in the DAC database is fully disaggregated by recipient country, partly because administra-
tive costs at headquarters are hard to allocate, partly because aid can support projects or pro-
grams intended to benefit an entire region or continent. The United States, for example, gave 
$2.486 billion in gross ODA in 2002 to “Least developed countries unspecified,” $117 million to 
“Americas Unspecified,” and a separate $22 million to “North and Central America Unallo-
cated.” In addition, it is impossible to assign selectivity weights to some recipients for lack of 
values for GDP/capita or the KK composite. These aid flows too cannot be discounted for selec-
tivity without further assumptions. 
Leaving out project or program aid that cannot be directly discounted for selectivity, 
whether for lack of specificity as to recipient or lack of recipient selectivity weight, would under-
state donors’ contributions. So such aid was incorporated as follows. For each sub-continental 
region, as defined in the DAC database, such aid was discounted by the donor’s average selectiv-
ity discount for project or program aid that could be directly discounted. An example: for Can-
ada’s aid to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2002, the average selectivity weight for project disbursements 
that are allocated down to the country level, and that go to countries with known selectivity 
weights, is 0.66. So the same weight was applied to Canadian project disbursements to “South of 
Sahara Unallocated,” and to its project disbursements to Liberia, whose lack of GDP data pre-
vented it from getting its own selectivity weight.
19 Once this discounting was done, all selectiv-
ity-discounted aid to the region was summed. This procedure repeated at the level of the conti-
nent, then the level of the Part, then the level of the aid recipient universe.
20 
Table 6 shows the results. The table reports the two measures of donor selectivity dis-
cussed earlier. In column C is “gross selectivity”—the average recipient selectivity factor of a 
donor’s recipients, weighted by gross disbursements of project, program, and emergency aid. In 
column F is the preferred measure, “net selectivity.” In general, the results are similar, though 
somewhat less so for donors that receive large flows of debt service, the IDB Fund for Special 
Operations being the most dramatic example. 
Greece earned the lowest net selectivity score among bilaterals in 2002. Japan and the 
United States also scored low—Japan because of its focus on its increasingly affluent East Asian 
                                                 
19 In making these extrapolations, unlike in 2003, project and program disbursements were actually treated sepa-
rately from debits against them—the tying penalties and debt service. Not doing this sometimes led to absurd results. 
A donor could receive $1 million net from a low-weighted country and then give a net $1.1 million (untied), to a 
high-weighted country in the same region, such that its weighted net transfer was $–0.4 million and its unweighted 
net transfer was $–0.1 million. Its average “selectivity” for the region would then have been $–0.4 million/$–0.1 
million = 4. If the donor also gave $10 million to a country in the same region without a selectivity weight, the algo-
rithm would have weighted this flow by 4, for $40 million in “selectivity-discounted” aid. This problem arises fun-
damentally from the mixing of positive and negative flows and net transfers. The solution is to do separate weight 
extrapolations for gross aid and the accumulated debits against it, then combine the two weighted flows with oppo-
site signs. 
20 The DAC database divides Part II counties not into continents but into two major groups—former eastern bloc 
nations, and relatively rich non-DAC members. For the present calculations, these two groups are treated as “conti-
nents.” neighborhood, the United States because of large transfers to low-weighted countries such as Co-
lombia, Israel, and Russia. At the high end are Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland, followed 
closely by Denmark and the United Kingdom.  
The new Dollar-Levin results on selectivity provide an interesting check on my own. 
They apply their method to gross non-emergency disbursements averaged over three subperiods: 
1985–89, 1990–94, 1995–99. To make a direct comparison, I back-calculated my approach to 
1995—not further because the Kaufmann-Kraay governance scores only start in 1996.
21 I com-
puted gross selectivity excluding emergency aid for each donor and year, then averaged over 
1995–99. There is a clear relationship between the two measures, with a correlation of 0.46, but 
also significant unique variation in each. (See Figure 5.) It would take further study to determine 
what the major source of difference is—the difference in definition of selectivity (marginal vs. 
average), the difference in governance indicator used, the project-program distinction in my in-
dex, or issues of sensitivity to specification choice in the Dollar and Levin approach. 
                                                 
21 The Kaufmann-Kraay variables are available for even years in 1996–2002. For odd years, I used the previous 




























 ---  (million $) ---  ---  (million $) ---   ---  (million $) --- 
Formula:     B/A     E/D     
Australia  777  439  0.56 777        439  0.56 701  394
Austria  509  267  0.52 504        264  0.52 474  247
Belgium  758  434  0.57 721        415  0.55 714  411
Canada  1,633  893  0.55 1,606        879  0.54 1,488  815
Denmark  1,178  723  0.61 1,124        697  0.59 1,089  668
Finland  291  171  0.59 283        169  0.58 270  159
France  5,624  2,544  0.45 4,678     2,144  0.38 4,335  1,942
Germany  4,538  2,347  0.52 3,237     1,815  0.40 3,118  1,731
Greece  123  51  0.41 123          51  0.41 101  42
Ireland  268  174  0.65 268        174  0.65 268  174
Italy  1,208  787  0.65 1,008        700  0.58 812  566
Japan  9,811  4,581  0.47 5,014     2,372  0.24 4,816  2,320
Netherlands  2,677  1,535  0.57 2,531     1,461  0.55 2,506  1,445
New Zealand  92  51  0.56 92          51  0.56 92  -2
Norway 1,193  769  0.64 1,188 766  0.64 1,186  765
Portugal  187  95  0.51 186          94  0.50 173  87
Spain  1,164  546  0.47 1,009        482  0.41 831  374
Sweden  1,351  879  0.65 1,350        879  0.65 1,341  873
Switzerland  826  524  0.63 822        522  0.63 820  521
United Kingdom  3,696  2,210  0.60 3,592     2,157  0.58 3,567  2,141
United States  13,847  6,756  0.49 12,371     6,137  0.44 10,400  5,117
AfDF  741  442  0.60 519        334  0.45 519  330
AsDF  1,168  628  0.54 750        438  0.37 750  438
CarDB  119  50  0.42 27            7  0.06 27  7
EBRD  72  27  0.38 72          27  0.38 72  27
EC  10,145  4,578  0.45 8,865     4,079  0.40 8,865  4,070
GEF  137  59  0.43 137          59  0.43 137  59
IDA  6,667  3,594  0.54 4,658      2,638  0.40 4,658  2,615
IDB Sp F  425  199  0.47 48          54  0.13 48  53
IFAD  250  140  0.56 114          74  0.30 114  73
Mont. Protocol  60  27  0.45 60          27  0.45 60  27
Nordic Dev.Fund  35  23  0.67 33          22  0.64 33  22
Other UN  630  275  0.44 630        275  0.44 630  275
SAF+ESAF(IMF)  2,936  1,789  0.61 951        750  0.26 951  750
UNDP  278  165  0.60 278        165  0.60 278  165
UNFPA  312  175  0.56 312        175  0.56 312  175
UNHCR  655  347  0.53 655        347  0.53 655  347
UNICEF  571  318  0.56 571        318  0.56 571  318
UNTA  478  248  0.52 478        248  0.52 478  248
WFP  352  207  0.59 352        207  0.59 352  207
      
U.S.-Colombia 346  109  0.31 305 98 0.32 256  82
1From previous tables.   Figure 5. Average selectivity of non-emergency disbursements, 1995–99, Dollar and Levin 
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6.  Penalizing proliferation 
“Project proliferation,” “fragmentation,” and “lack of coordination” have long been cited as ma-
jor problems for aid effectiveness. Donors often act at cross-purposes—one donor’s trains won’t 
run on another’s tracks, literally or metaphorically. Or donors overload recipient ministries with 
mission visitations and project reporting requirements (Acharya, de Lima, and Moore 2003). For 
this reason, the 2004 CDI aid component includes a new penalty for project proliferation.
22 
  Though the transaction costs of aid are widely thought to be substantial, they have mostly 
defied direct measurement. For example, Brown et al. (2000) set out to measure aid transaction 
costs in Vietnam but ended up obtaining only anecdotal information. A pair of recent papers has 
made fresh contributions to analyzing the extent of proliferation and indirectly measuring its 
costs. Arnab Acharya, Ana Fuzzo de Lima, and Mick Moore (2003) developed indexes of do-
nors’ tendency to proliferate (disperse) aid among recipients, and of the tendency of recipients’ 
aid to be fragmented among many donors. Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman (2004) measured 
fragmentation similarly, and found it to be predictive of lower recipient bureaucratic quality. 
They theorized that donors out-compete recipient governments for the scarce resource of skilled 
local workers. 
                                                 
22 I thank Robert Picciotto for the suggestion that inspired this change. The inputs to the indexes of proliferation and fragmentation in these papers are data on 
aid disbursements by donor and recipient, from Table 2a of the DAC database. Given that data-
set, the indexes are logical first steps toward measuring proliferation. But this style of analysis 
also has disadvantages. The Acharya, de Lima, and Moore proliferation index does not discrimi-
nate between concentrating aid in India and concentrating it in Vanuatu, yet presumably concen-
tration in Vanuatu would overwhelm local absorptive capacity. It does not draw a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, donors that tend to enter sectors and countries already crowded with 
other donors’ projects and, on the other, donors that tend to avoid crowded country-sectors, 
thereby reducing administrative burdens on particular line ministries. Finally, it does not distin-
guish between project and program aid even though one rationale for program aid is that it re-
duces transaction costs of aid. 
Roodman (forthcoming) develops a model of proliferation that uses a richer dataset to 
make all these distinctions. The model takes most of its data from the detailed commitment-level 
CRS database rather than DAC Table 2a. It is calibrated against the example of Tanzania, which 
last year declared a “mission holiday,” during which only the most urgent visits would be ac-
cepted from donor officials. This is taken as a sign that the marginal cost of aid in Tanzania, as 
currently supplied, has matched its marginal benefit. The model’s output is a coarse estimate of 
the marginal “proliferation cost” of each donor’s aid activities in each recipient country and sec-
tor. The cost is assumed to occur when a project diverts scarce recipient-side resources such as 
administrative capacity from other aid projects and programs in the same sector, thus reducing 
their effectiveness and value. 
The model was originally designed for use in the index, but because the theory and im-
plementation are fairly complex in their details, and because the model is tenuously calibrated to 
empirical data, it seemed best not to use it directly.
23 Instead, I regressed the model’s results for 
total proliferation cost as a share of gross disbursements, aggregated at the donor level and dis-
counted for selectivity, against a set of more straightforward potential indicators of proliferation 
cost, such as the number of aid commitments under $100,000, average recipient GDP, and the 
share of project aid in total aid. The share of aid commitment dollars committed in amounts less 
than $100,000 turned out to have a correlation of 0.78 with the full model’s results, and other 
indicators could explain little additional variation.
24 (This is not the percentage of distinct aid 
commitments made in amounts below $100,000.) In a simple regression without a constant term, 
the slope was 3.4.
25 Interestingly, this suggests that the emphasis of Acharya, de Lima, and 
Moore on a donor’s dispersal within the universe of recipients is somewhat misplaced. The num-
ber of distinct projects an aid flow supports may matter more for proliferation cost. Indeed the 
model results are, if anything, negatively correlated with their index. 
The upshot is a simple formula for the proliferation penalty in the present aid index: 
 
share of aid commitment dollars committed in quanta less than $100,000 × 3.4 × gross aid. 
 
                                                 
23 Thanks to Paul Isenman, Steven Radelet, Peter Timmer, and John Williamson, among others, for persuading me 
of this. 
24 Within a fairly wide range, the exact cutoff does not matter much. Cut-offs of $25,000, $50,000, or $200,000 all 
gave almost the same correlation. 
25 In the computations for the 2004 CDI, the coefficient used was 4.0. I use 3.4 here because of the change in selec-
tivity weights described in footnote 18 after the CDI numbers were frozen. Reducing the selectivity weights reduced 
the selectivity-weighted proliferation costs, the dependent variable in the regression. Unlike all calculations described before, these are carried out at the donor level, not the donor-
recipient level. Table 7 shows the results. Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and UNICEF appear 
to be major funders of small projects.
26 Unfortunately, many multilaterals did not report the req-
uisite data to DAC; I assigned them a proliferation cost of 0. It is reassuring that most of the mul-
tilaterals that did report got low or 0 proliferation penalties. And a 0 is clearly appropriate for the 
only major multilateral not reporting, the IMF. 
Since this is the final quality consideration factored into the aid index, the result of sub-
tracting this penalty from the previous step’s results is, at last, “quality-adjusted aid quantity” (or 
simply “quality-adjusted aid”) for each donor, whether bilateral or multilateral, as shown in 
Table 7. Strikingly, Spain and New Zealand emerge with zero or negative scores for their bilat-
eral aid programs because of relatively low selectivity and a high apparent tendency to fund 
small projects.  
 
                                                 
26 New Zealand has not reported CRS data since 1995, making it is impossible to compute the share of its aid com-
mitments dollars committed in amounts under $100,000. So results from the full proliferation model, which involve 
a set of extrapolations, were used. In the calculations for the 2004 CDI, the same was done for Denmark, which re-
ported all its technical cooperation commitments as a single entry in 2002. In this paper, however, I decided to use 
Denmark’s data for 2001, which disaggregated technical cooperation. This seemed more accurate, and happened to 




















 (million  $)  (%)  ------------------- (million $) ------------------- 
Formula:   B  × 3.4 × A  D–C 
Australia 777  3.9 104 394 291
Austria 509  4.2 72 247 175
Belgium 758  5.7 148 411 264
Canada 1,633  1.5 85 815 730
Denmark 1,178  0.4
2 14 668 654
Finland 291  4.0 39 159 120
France 5,624  1.5 294 1,942 1,648
Germany 4,538  1.0 151 1,731 1,580
Greece 123  9.9 41 42 1
Ireland 268  13.7 125 174 49
Italy 1,208  0.0 1 566 565
Japan 9,811  0.0 8 2,320 2,311
Netherlands 2,677  0.8 70 1,445 1,375
New Zealand  92  0.0 0 -2 -2
Norway 1,193  8.2 334 765 431
Portugal 187  9.3 59 87 28
Spain 1,164  9.7 382 374 -8
Sweden 1,351  2.3 107 873 765
Switzerland 826 2.1 59 521 462
United Kingdom  3,696  0.5 64 2,141 2,076
United States  13,847  0.3 154 5,117 4,963
AfDF 741  0.0 0 330 330
AsDF 1,168  0.0 0 438 438
CarDB 119  N/A 0 7 7
EBRD 72  N/A 0 27 27
EC 10,145  0.2 72 4,070 3,998
GEF 137  N/A 0 59 59
IDA 6,667  0.0 0 2,615 2,615
IDB Sp F  425  0.0 0 53 53
IFAD 250  0.0 0 73 73
Montreal Protocol  60  N/A 0 27 27
Nordic Dev.Fund  35  N/A 0 22 22
Other UN  630  N/A 0 275 275
SAF+ESAF(IMF) 2,936  N/A 0 750 750
UNDP 278  N/A 0 165 165
UNFPA 312  N/A 0 175 175
UNHCR 655  N/A 0 347 347
UNICEF 571  10.8 211 318 107
UNTA 478  N/A 0 248 248
WFP 352  0.0 0 207 207
1From previous tables. 
2Figure is for 2001 for lack of complete 2002 data.  7.  Allocating multilateral quality-adjusted aid to bilaterals 
Since the motivation for this exercise is to compare national governments, it is important to give 
bilaterals credit for their contributions to multilateral institutions. This final step in computing 
the index of official aid performance is done following established DAC methodology. Bilaterals 
receive credit for the aid programs of multilaterals in proportion to the bilaterals’ contributions to 
those multilaterals during the same year. For example, since France accounted for 5.96 percent 
of contributions to the IDA during 2002, it received 5.96 percent of the IDA’s quality-adjusted 
aid of $2.6 billion, or $156 million.
27 (See Table 8.)  
The penultimate column of Table 8 is the final measure of official aid performance: qual-
ity-adjusted aid as a share of donor GDP. GDP figures are converted to dollars using market ex-
change rates, and are from World Bank (2003). 
Despite the quality adjustments, what most distinguishes donors from each other in this 
index is still the sheer quantity of aid they disburse, especially when measured as true net trans-
fers. Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden are large donors by DAC’s net ODA 
measure, and they score highest on this one too, with at least 0.38% of GDP for 2002. The two 
largest donors in absolute terms, Japan and the United States score low, Japan at 0.09%, the 
United States at 0.06%. Unlike last year, however, they are no longer the bottom two in the rank-
ings. This time, Greece, New Zealand, and Spain score lower than Japan because of the new pro-
liferation penalty. 
The final column of Table 8 offers a quantitative measure of aid quality: the ratio of qual-
ity-adjusted aid to net aid. New Zealand and Ireland again appear near the bottom, at 9% and 
30% respectively, because of proliferation
28; Portugal scores low (34%) because of proliferation 
and low selectivity; and Spain and Greece are low (25% and 31%) because those factors and 
high tying. The leaders are the Netherlands (52%), the United Kingdom (52%), Denmark and 
Switzerland (54%), Sweden (55%), and Italy (56%). Italy comes out on top, despite high tying, 
because of minimal proliferation and high selectivity. 
Although the final scores are expressed as percentages of GDP, they should not be com-
pared to other variables so expressed, such as net ODA, only to each other. The selectivity ad-
justment could have super-weighted aid to the most appropriate recipients rather than discount-
ing aid to the less appropriate ones. This equally meaningful (and arbitrary) choice would make 
little difference for the relative results, but would raise scores across the board. 
I back-calculated this index of official aid performance to explore the time-series as well 
as cross-sectional variation in scores. What set the starting point of the time frame was the avail-
ability of the Kaufmann-Kraay governance variable. It is available for even years in 1996–2002. 
For odd years, I used the following year’s score, and this allowed me to calculate the index for 
1995–2002. Total quality-adjusted aid/GDP of bilaterals was fairly stable over this short period. 
The simple average was 0.20% in 1995 and 0.21% in 2002, and the correlation of 1995 and 2002 
scores was 0.93.
29 (See Figure 6.) 
                                                 
27 A few small multilaterals, such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration received contributions in 
2002 but did not themselves report to DAC on their own aid allocations (examples include). This made it impossible 
to compute their quality-adjusted aid and allocate it back to bilaterals. To prevent contributions to these unscored 
multilaterals from being dropped, a simple extrapolation was performed based on each bilateral’s ratio of quality-
adjusted allocated back from scored multilaterals to contributions the donor made to those multilaterals. 
28 However, the proliferation penalty for New Zealand is highly approximate because of missing data. See note 26. 
29 These figures exclude Greece, which did not report to DAC for 1995, and may have given essentially no aid. Aid quality (quality-adjusted aid/net aid) was more volatile, though mostly within the 40–
60% range. Its average was 44% in 1995 and 43%. The most dramatic result here is the wild 
swings for the small donors that get large proliferation penalties, especially Greece, New Zea-
land, and Spain. Ireland is deemed such a proliferation in some years that its aid program appears 
to do more harm than good. The correlation between the 1995 and 2002 scores is 0.70, but the 
correlation with 2002 dropped as low as 0.40 in 1997 because of the Ireland’s score of –60% that 
year. While it seems likely Ireland is indeed a “proliferator” by the standards of its peers, this 
volatility in results does also suggest that it would be valuable to explore how to refine the com-
putation of the proliferation penalty. Perhaps, for example, there could be special treatment for 
grants to NGOs or technical cooperation. 
Table 8. Allocating multilateral quality-adjusted aid to bilaterals, 2002 



















 (million  $)  ----- (million $) ----- -----  (million $) ----- (million $)  -----  (%) ----- 
Australia 1,003  777  225 1,003 291 116 407 411,000  0.10 41
Austria 721  504  212 716 175 117 292 203,000  0.14 41
Belgium 1,211  721  453 1,173 264 256 520 248,000  0.21 44
Canada 2,155  1,606  522 2,128 730 256 986 716,000  0.14 46
Denmark 1,863  1,124  684 1,809 654 325 979 175,000  0.56 54
Finland 540  283  249 532 120 127 246 131,000  0.19 46
France 8,068  4,678  2,444 7,121 1,648 1,612 3,260 1,410,000  0.23 46
Germany 7,140  3,237  2,602 5,839 1,580 1,281 2,861 1,980,000  0.14 49
Greece 292  123  169 292 1 89 90 133,000  0.07 31
Ireland 426  268  157 426 49 80 128 120,000  0.11 30
Italy 2,547  1,008  1,338 2,346 565 762 1,327 1,180,000  0.11 57
Japan 12,445  5,014  2,634 7,648 2,311 1,401 3,712 3,980,000  0.09 49
Netherlands 3,660  2,531  983 3,514 1,375 464 1,839 414,000  0.44 52
New Zealand  124  92  32 124 -2 14 12 58,200  0.02 9
Norway 1,757  1,188  564 1,752 431 289 720 189,000  0.38 41
Portugal 356  186  169 356 28 92 119 121,000  0.10 34
Spain 1,883  1,009  720 1,729 -8 447 439 650,000  0.07 25
Sweden 2,094  1,350  743 2,094 765 396 1,161 230,000  0.50 55
Switzerland 1,018  822  192 1,014 462 87 549 268,000  0.20 54
United Kingdom  5,571  3,592  1,875 5,466 2,076 792 2,869 1,550,000  0.19 52
United States  16,749  12,371  2,902 15,274 4,963 1,432 6,395 10,400,000  0.06 42
































































8.  Rewarding tax policies that support private giving
30 
One frequent comment on the first CDI was that it ought to reward countries for private charita-
ble giving to developing countries. Yes, U.S. official aid, say, is low compared to GDP, but 
aren’t Americans generous as private citizens? In response, the new edition of the aid index fac-
tors in private giving. But since the aid component is supposed to assess government policy, it 
did not seem appropriate to simply add private giving to public. The decision to give privately is 
influenced, but not made, by governments. The approach now taken in the CDI is to estimate the 
proportional increase in giving caused by each country’s tax policies, compare that to actual giv-
ing, then work backwards to estimate how much giving would have occurred in the absence of 
the policies and how much is a credit to their presence. Two aspects of fiscal policy are consid-
ered. First are targeted income tax incentives that lower the “price” of giving. Second is the total 
                                                 
30 Alicia Bannon contributed to this section. tax revenue/GDP ratio: lower taxes leave citizens and corporations with more after-tax income to 
give to charity.
31 
The approach taken here will seem simplistic to some and too sophisticated to others. To 
make the calculations practical, we had to make several major simplifying assumptions. Each 
country’s tax policies are complex and idiosyncratic. No two households are in exactly the same 
financial position, and so the tax codes present different incentives to different households. And 
of course different people respond to the same incentives differently. On the other hand, the so-
phistication of the calculations, such as it is, should not be read to imply that believe that our es-
timates of the effects of policy on giving cannot be greatly improved. We do believe they repre-
sent a reasonable way to incorporate some policy indicators into the index with appropriate 
weighting. And it seems unlikely that major changes in methodology affect the overall results 
much.  
All but three CDI countries—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—offer income tax deductions 
or credits for charitable giving.
32 These incentives lower the price of giving in the sense that a 
dollar of forgone after-tax income buys more than a dollar of charity. Charitable donations can 
fund the operations of non-profit groups working in developing countries, such as Oxfam and 
CARE, or they can go to foundations that fund such projects. We treated all income tax incen-
tives for charitable giving as deductions; that is, we treat them as reducing the price of giving by 
“the” marginal income tax rate. 
We translated the presence of a tax incentive into a estimated for the increase in charity in 
two steps. First, we used a crude but available proxy for the marginal income tax rate faced by 
the households with above-average incomes that generate most charity. This proxy is the share of 
gross wage earnings going to income tax for workers at 167% of the income level of the average 
production worker (OECD 2003b, p. 80). Thus, for example, this tax rate is 22.6% for the United 
States, so incentives in the U.S. tax code are treated as reducing the price of charitable giving by 
22.6%. Second, we couple this with an estimate of “the” price elasticity of giving. Recent re-
search puts it at around 0.5 in the United States (Andreoni 2001). Thus, if a representative indi-
vidual in the United States faced a marginal tax rate of 22.6%, full deductibility of charitable 
contributions would multiply giving by a factor of (1 – 0.226)
–0.5 = 1.137, for a 13.7% increase. 
The procedure is similar for the effect of having lower total taxes. When the overall tax 
ratio is lower individuals have more money to give to charity. Thus, while high tax rates increase 
the incentive to give when we look at the price effects of tax deductions, they decrease the incen-
tive to give when we look at income effects. Among the 21 scored countries, the tax reve-
nue/GDP ratio in 2001 ranged between 27.3% (in Japan) to 51.4% (in Sweden) (OECD 2003a, p. 
72). To reward countries for lower tax ratios, we needed a baseline against which to define low-
ness. We chose Sweden’s tax ratio, the hightest. We coupled this with an estimate of the income 
of elasticity of giving at 1.1 (Andreoni 2001). The United States, to continue the example, is 
treated as having reduced its total tax burden from Sweden’s 51.4% to the actual 28.9%. This 
raises the privately claimed share of GDP from 48.6% to 71.1%, an increase of 46.3% relative to 
the baseline.
33 As a result, the lower U.S. tax burden is estimated to multiply charity by 
                                                 
31 This is not a simplistic endorsement of low taxes or high budget deficits. 
32 This information was compiled by CGD from various sources. Details are available upon request. 
33 Some share of the revenue funds transfer payments, which the recipients may use as they please, including for 
charitable giving. The precise effect of this redistribution on giving is difficult to know because it depends on such 
factors as the difference in income between the typical taxpayer and typical transfer recipient. This seems like too 
complicated an issue to address. , 520 . 1
514 . 0 1










for a 52.0% increase. 
The two multipliers are then multiplied, inverted, and applied against observed giving in 
order to estimate giving in the absence of these favorable policies. Observed giving is “grants by 
NGOs” from DAC Table 1; it counts contributions by foundations and individuals, which do or-
dinarily go through NGOs, but exclude official aid that is channeled through NGOs. The result is 
a set of estimates for the dollar increase in private giving to developing countries caused by fiscal 
policy. In the U.S. case, the multipliers combine to 1.727. Observed giving of $5.66 billion in 
2002 is 72.7% above $3.27 billion, so U.S. policy is credited for the difference, $2.38 billion. 
(See Table 9.) 
To incorporate the results on charitable giving attributed to policy into the main quality-
adjusted aid measure, it was necessary to discount the results for quality in parallel fashion. As 
noted above, quality-adjusted aid cannot be directly compared or added to simple aid totals. 
Moreover, private giving too can go to countries that are more or less appropriate for aid, and 
can contribute to the problems of project proliferation, for example, by siphoning off talented 
administrators from government service. So as a rough adjustment in the absence of information 
on the quality of private aid, the CDI discounts policy-induced private giving by the simple aver-
age of the quality discounts for the bilaterals’ own aid programs, which is 62%.
34,35 
Incorporating private giving turns out to have marginal effects on the scores. In the case 
of the United States, a country often pointed to as a stingy public donor and a generous source of 
private charity, a country where one might expect a large effect, the result is $908 in quality-
adjusted charitable giving attributed to tax policy. Added to the country’s $6.37 billion in official 





                                                 
34 The aid component of the 2004 CDI erroneously multiplied charitable giving by about this factor rather than dis-
counting by it. The effect was to somewhat exaggerate the value of charitable giving–related policies. 
35 The discount is relative to net aid. The 62% average excludes New Zealand because of the low confidence in its 
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(1+E)–1  F/(1+G)  H–G 
Australia  1  32.0 21.3 30.1 49.2 80.9 229          127   103
Austria  0  17.3 0.0 45.4 13.7 13.7 54           47   6
Belgium  1  34.4 23.5 45.8 12.7 39.2 69           49   19
Canada  1  24.8 15.3 35.1 37.5 58.5 277          175   102
Denmark  1  41.5 30.7 49.8 3.6 35.5 17           12   4
Finland  0  32.8 0.0 46.1 12.1 12.1 10             9   1
France  1  17.9 10.4 45.0 14.6 26.5 203          160   42
Germany  1  29.5 19.1 36.8 33.5 59.0 770          484   286
Greece  1  7.6 4.0 36.9 33.3 38.6 5             4   1
Ireland  1  22.2 13.4 29.9 49.6 69.6 78           46   32
Italy  1  24.2 14.9 42.0 21.5 39.5 32           23   9
Japan  1  9.4 5.1 27.3 55.7 63.6 165          101   64
Netherlands  1  21.2 12.7 39.5 27.2 43.3 236          165   71
N. Zealand  1  25.7 16.0 33.8 40.5 63.0 21           13   8
Norway  1  28.4 18.2 43.3 18.5 40.0 404          288   115
Portugal  1  12.2 6.7 33.5 41.2 50.7 5             3   2
Spain  1  17.8 10.3 35.2 37.2 51.4 118           78   40
Sweden  0  30.8 0.0 51.4 0.0 0.0 18           18   0
Switzerland  1  14.6 8.2 30.6 48.0 60.1 186          116   70
U.K.  1  18.2 10.6 37.3 32.3 46.3 328          224   104
U.S.  1  22.6 13.7 28.9 52.0 72.7 5,656       3,274   2,381
1Income tax as % of gross wage earnings (2002)—single individual at 167% income level of the average 
production worker. 
2Data for latest available year. 
3Price elasticity of giving taken to be –0.5. 
4Income 
elasticity of giving taken to be 1.1. 


















 ----------  (million $) ----------  (%) 
Formula:   B × 0.38 (A + C)/GDP
Australia 407 103 39 0.11
Austria 292 6 2 0.15
Belgium 520 19 7 0.21
Canada 986 102 39 0.14
Denmark 979 4 2 0.56
Finland 246 1 0 0.19
France 3,260 42 16 0.23
Germany 2,861 286 109 0.15
Greece 90 1 1 0.07
Ireland 128 32 12 0.12
Italy 1,327 9 4 0.11
Japan 3,712 64 24 0.09
Netherlands 1,839 71 27 0.45
New Zealand  12 8 3 0.03
Norway 720 115 44 0.40
Portugal 119 2 1 0.10
Spain 439 40 15 0.07
Sweden 1,161 0 0 0.50
Switzerland 549 70 27 0.21
United Kingdom  2,869 104 40 0.19
United States  6,395 2,381 908 0.07
   
1From Table 8. 
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